URBAN HISPANIC POVERTY IN THE U.S.: THEORY AND CONTEXT BY Robert Aponte Michigan State University   Working Paper #6 July, 1990   Abstract: The following essay presents an overview of various issues concerning the high rate of poverty among urban Hispanics (Latinos) in the United States. The major contemporary theories and hypotheses relating to poverty among ethnic or racial minorities are briefly outlined with a view toward assessing how well they appear to help explain the impoverishment of urban Latinos. None of the explanations covered appears to fully explain the problem by itself, although two or three appear to account well for a substantial part of it. In part, this is likely to result from the fact that the Hispanic population of the United States consists of several subgroups with vastly different experiences in this country. Indeed, the initial and major arguments of the paper consist of emphasizing the importance of separating the Latino subgroups for individual treatment when analyzing their respective economic circumstances. In particular, it is shown that differences in the subgroups' timing and patterns of settlement can affect their relative well-being. The focus of the essay is on the two largest of the Latino subgroups, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, who together are shown to account for over 4 out of 5 of the known Hispanic poor. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments on early drafts of this paper by Julie Quiroz, of the National Council of La Raza, and Dr. Joseph Spielberg Benitez, Julian Samora Research Institute.   About the Author: Robert Aponte is a visiting lecturer in the James Madison College at Michigan State University, and a research associate of the Julian Samora Research Institute. Mr. Aponte, a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of Chicago, is currently finishing work on a dissertation dealing with Hispanic poverty and "underclass" issues in the city of Chicago. A major purpose of the following is to briefly outline some of the various theories or explanations of urban poverty which may relate to the impoverishment of urban Hispanics, suggesting along the way, why and how particular explanations may do so. But the major thrust of my presentation will consist of my elaborating on particular aspects of the problem and an argument for assessing both the statistics conveying the problem, and the various explanations for them, from the perspective of analyzing the two major Hispanic groups separately. I further argue that this should be done with particular attention to the varying conditions accompanying their integration within the larger society. It has only been in recent years that sufficient data have been available to closely monitor the economic fortunes of the diverse groups that together comprise the category of Hispanic - the nation's 2nd largest minority. Much of what we have since learned has been startling, to say the least. We have learned, for example, that poverty among Puerto Ricans, the traditionally most urban and second largest Hispanic group, has hovered at a rate averaging over 40% in the last several years -- a rate second to none among American ethnic of racial groups.[1] Moreover, the rate of poverty among Hispanics in general has grown far more rapidly, in recent years, than that of whites or blacks, as forcefully argued in a recent report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.[2] The 1987 Hispanic Poverty rate of slightly greater than 28% is less than 5 percentage points lower than that of blacks, traditionally the poorest group, and nearly three times that of whites, despite the fact that the labor force participation rate of Hispanics is significantly higher than that of these other groups. Moreover, the recent increase in Hispanic poverty, as shown in the Policy Center Report, has been fueled largely by increases in poverty among two parent families. Thus, it cannot be blamed on the relatively modest rise in Hispanic single parent families of this recent period nor can it easily be pinned on sagging work efforts, given Hispanics' higher than average participation in the work force. However, these are national, rather than urban trends, and they mask much divergence in the actual experiences of the individual Hispanic groups. It is crucial that, to the extent possible, the information on the various subgroups be presented separately; that the urban or metropolitan patterns be separated from the rural or non-metropolitan, and most importantly of all, that such figures be placed squarely in the context of various Hispanic groups' distinct patterns of urban settlement, especially with respect to the locus and pace of these settlements. This is important because the rate and types of economic activities that have prevailed in this country have varied considerably across time, regions, and individual urban areas, thereby providing varying structures of opportunity for reviving groups. In turn, the urban settlement patterns of the two major Hispanic groups have greatly differed, especially with respect to geography and timing, as I will outline momentarily. To speak of Hispanic poverty in urban America, however, is to speak, essentially, of the two largest groups, those of Mexican and those of Puerto Rican extraction, who together account for roughly three fourths of all U.S. Hispanics.[3] In addition to their overwhelming numeric dominance over the other Hispanic groups, these largest groups also have the highest rates of poverty. Together they accounted for well over 80% of all 1986 Hispanic poor within metropolitan areas, their central cities taken separately, or the continental U.S. as a whole.[4] Cubans, the next largest group, have accounted for only about five to six percent of all Hispanics during the 1980's, and have significantly lower rates of poverty than the larger groups.[5] For example, a special report of Hispanics with data for 1987 reveals that poor Cuban families accounted for under four percent of Hispanic families in poverty that year.[6] The remaining several groups taken together probably account for less than 15% of the Hispanic poor. Hence, the commanding importance of the two major groups to the overall picture. But, as stated earlier, despite important similarities, there are critical difference between the urban settlement patterns of these two major groups with implications for their economic integration. Their major points of similarity include mother tongue, economic or labor migrant status, and relatively low levels of skill, command of English and formal education. However, whereas the urban settlement of Puerto Ricans on the mainland occurred rapidly, was highly concentrated in a major northern city, and began largely after World War II, among Mexican origin Hispanics the process transpired throughout much of the 20th century, was far more gradual and diffuse, but was nonetheless contained largely within the Southwest section of the country. Indeed, only in a few Midwestern cities, notably Chicago, where small proportions of each group have settled, do Mexicans and Puerto Ricans maintain any substantial co-residence. From less than 100,000 at the end of World War II, the Puerto Rican population on the mainland grew to well over 1 million by 1970, at which time a solid majority were residents of New York City.[7] By 1980, the city no longer contained a majority of the nearly two million mainland Puerto Ricans. Nonetheless, most of those living elsewhere resided in large metropolitan cities, mostly in the Northeast. Indeed, fully 98% of all mainland Puerto Ricans were metropolitan residents in 1986, a figure similar to that which they have maintained throughout four decades of rapid growth.[8] By contrast, the proportion of Mexican origin residents living in metropolitan areas in 1986, some 90%, represents the culmination of a shift that goes back to about 1930 when work by Bean and Tienda suggests the group was about half rural.[9] And, whereas over three quarters of all mainland Puerto Ricans resided inside the central cities in 1986, slightly less than half of the Mexican origin group did so.[10] Finally, the most recent regional figures, those for 1980, show that while fully 85% of all mainland Puerto Ricans still live in the North, 90% of all Mexican origin Hispanics continue living in the Southwest.[11] A final issue concerning the settlement process relates to the present. Whereas the days of rapid immigration have long since passed for Puerto Ricans, it is clear that the Mexican-origin population, urban and rural alike, has continued to receive migrants in recent years, a matter of some significance to issues raised subsequently. Hence, the numeric dominance of Chicanos over Puerto Ricans is likely to increase in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the estimated population of nearly 12 million Mexican-origin Hispanics in 1987, which accounted for about 63% of all Hispanics, was about 5 times the size of the estimated 2.3-odd million Puerto Ricans.[12] In summary, the urbanization of Puerto Ricans occurred far more rapidly and in a smaller number of places. This smaller group continues to be more highly urbanized and predominately Northern in residence. The Mexican origin group, though currently almost as likely to live in metropolitan areas, is far less tied to the central cities, experienced a far more gradual urbanization process, and remains solidly tied to sunbelt residence. There are several ways in which these settlement differences may affect social mobility. First, the economic well-being of Puerto Ricans can be expected to hinge heavily on economic conditions in the major cities of the eastern end of the snowbelt, especially New York, and be particularly dependent on the opportunity structure confronting the less skilled in that area. Such conditions have not been favorable in recent decades.[13] By contrast, Mexican origin Hispanics are more dependent upon the opportunity structures confronting less skilled labor in sunbelt cities and their suburbs, but without massive reliance on only one or two such areas, and with far less dependence on central city employment. These places are believed to be areas with better job prospects for the less skilled than Northern cities.[14] A second important distinction concerns social welfare provisions. Specifically, Puerto Ricans have settled into the relatively more generous states of the North, while their brethren of Mexican-extraction populate a band of states with traditionally low levels of assistance. A notable exception to this is California -- the state with the largest number of Mexican origin Hispanics. However, given the high proportions of non-citizens within this group, relatively few may be able to avail themselves of such provisions. While it is true that no state in the continental U.S. currently provides an adequate level of benefits, and this is a very serious problem, this was not always so. For example, in New York City during the late 1960's, the maximum AFDC benefit package for a family of three, discounting food stamps, could raise the family's income to 97% of the poverty line at that time.[15] The payment levels, moreover, declined only gradually during the first part of the 1970's. Thus, the notion that welfare may have been a viable option for some Hispanic poor is not ill conceived. Given the significantly higher proportions of families led by women among Puerto Ricans (see Figures in text below) it stands to reason that explanations about poverty or the rise in families led by women which hinge on levels or accessibility to welfare assistance should have far more relevance to Puerto Ricans than to Mexican origin residents. Still another potentially relevant difference between the areas of settlement concerns the organization of labor. Puerto Ricans entered the more highly protected or unionized labor markets, which generally prevailed in the North, unlike the situation in Western and Southern states. Furthermore, the relative disadvantage thereby confronting Chicanos is compounded by the high rate of non-citizens among them who are especially vulnerable to exploitative practices of employers. The mere availability of such workers could, in turn, exert downward pressure on wages even for those with the rights of citizenship. A final consequence of the differing settlement experiences of extreme significance, though often overlooked, concerns the rapidity of the Puerto Rican migration in conjunction with the movement of other groups. First off, an especially rapid rate of in-migration might well be expected to retard the ability of all but the most robust economies to absorb arriving groups. More importantly, however, it is crucial to keep sight of the fact that the Puerto Rican entry into the major cities of the North coincided with that of the 2nd great wave of Southern blacks - one of the most massive movements of people in our nation's history! It is difficult indeed, if not impossible, to imagine the impact of the combined movements on the capacity of these areas' economies and public institutions to accommodate the arrival of these groups. Given these conditions as a whole, we might expect the following results to obtain. Mexican origin urbanites might be expected to work more steadily, but to generally earn less, and be better represented by the working poor than by the dependent poor. Puerto Ricans might be expected to earn more, but work far less, yet be able to rely more upon public assistance, albeit at the cost of higher rates of family dissolution. In turn, they might be expected to sustain more poverty and to be considerably more represented by the dependent poor, than by the working poor. Indeed, the statistical indicators reveal just such a pattern. For example, among men aged 20 years and over, Puerto Ricans had a labor force participation rate 10 percentage points lower than those of Mexican origin men in 1987. This represents a widening of the respective 1977 gap of only five percentage points. The employment-to-population ratios exhibited a similar gap, but they remained unchanged over the ten year period, with the Puerto Rican ratio trailing that of the Mexican origin group by 10 percentage points throughout.[16] This reflects the fact that the Mexican unemployment rate is catching up to the Puerto Rican rate, a point noted in the Policy Center Report. And, as expected, Puerto Ricans are also poorer than Chicanos. The central city poverty rate for Puerto Ricans in 1986 was 45%. The Mexican origin central city rate was "only" 30%. The metropolitan area rates were similarly distributed. Likewise, the proportion of families headed by women among central city Puerto Ricans at that time was 49% while the respective figure among Chicanos was only 22.5%[17] Finally, the Current Population Survey reveals that many more Mexican origin families have members in the work force than is true for Puerto Rican families, while a substantially higher proportion of the latter receive government assistance. And, the gaps are startling. For example, in 1986 fully 75% of all Mexican origin families in poverty had at least one member in the work force. Only about 27% of comparable Puerto Rican families did so. Conversely, whereas 63% of Puerto Rican families in poverty that year received all of their income in some form of assistance or transfer, only 22% of Mexican origin families did so.[18] It would appear most unlikely that these enormous differences can be accounted for simply by the difference in the proportions of families headed by single women between the groups. It seems likely that the kind of approach urged here - one that maximizes sensitivity to the varying situations of the sub groups - can also help in interpreting trends among data that are largely aggregated. For example, the important and highly informative Policy Center Report reaches a number of findings that I think can be pushed further. It concluded that recent increases in Hispanic poverty are associated only weakly, if at all, with recent increases in female headship or joblessness within the group. Rather, it showed that the poverty increases were strongly associated with declining real wages. It noted, but did not directly connect to these trends, the fact that increases in poverty were especially in evidence among Mexican-origin Hispanics, on the one hand, and among the Sunbelt and Midwest regions on the other. Bringing in the kind of perspective I advocate can perhaps help to connect these trends. For example, declining real wages would be expected to bring a greater proportion of Chicanos into poverty than Puerto Ricans because the first group has a much higher proportion of their people in very low wage jobs. In turn, Mexican dominance in the three regions outside of the Northeast helps explain why those regions, but not the Northeast, were more affected by the rise in poverty traceable to real wage declines, even as the Puerto Rican dominated Northeastern region maintained the highest level of poverty. Furthermore, consideration of another contextual factor distinguishing the two groups, mainly that the Mexican origin group continues to receive migrants, leads to a second hypothesis about why Mexicans might be especially vulnerable to falling real wages. This would be that they are employed in sectors that are plagued by sustained labor market crowding resulting from continued immigrations, especially since much of it consists of the "undocumented," a group that clearly constitutes cheaper labor. Those with lower levels of education might be especially hurt by all this, a fact raised in the Report, since they are most likely to directly compete with newcomers. Maintaining an emphasis on the context of settlement is also important when studying the poverty problems of the newer Hispanic immigrants. Although up to the present they have not been numerous enough to have an impact on the economic trends for all Hispanics taken as a group, this could change when badly needed information on them becomes available from the 1990 census. In addition, as noted by the Policy Center Report, what data we have suggests they are experiencing substantial poverty. Whatever their economic conditions, the individual groups ought to be studied separately, when possible, especially if they differ on such characteristics as port of entry, educational attainment, etc., as these factors are important to the mobility process, and studies not taking them into account may mislead, rather than illuminate, the process of research.   Explanations of Urban Poverty Currently, popular theories or explanations about urban poverty tend to fall short of completely accounting for the varying experiences of poverty among the two major Hispanic groups. However, a few relate well to at least part of the problem. The following sketches out a number of the major contemporary views on these issues along with brief comments on their applicability to Hispanics. The Mismatch Thesis. This explanation, most recently associated with the work of John Kasarda and William Julius Wilson,[19]focuses mainly on older, northern, industrial towns. It finds recent urban poverty rooted in the movement of manufacturing and other blue-collar industry away from the snowbelt central cities where Blacks and Hispanics make up increasingly larger proportions of the population. As blue-collar industry moved from the cities to the suburbs and from the Snow Belt to the Sun Belt, according to the argument, central city job growth occurred primarily in white-collar jobs for which the Black and Hispanic central city residents often did not qualify. One criticism of this explanation rests on the argument that the unemployment rates of central city Blacks and those of suburban Blacks are fairly close despite the presumed greater number of unskilled jobs in suburbs.20 As presently conceived, this explanation would be relevant primarily for Puerto Ricans who are heavily concentrated in northern industrial cities. The theory thus offers no explanation for the poverty of Mexican origin Hispanics, the largest of the Hispanic groups and the group with the most poor, since relatively few live in northern central cities. The Culture of Poverty. This thesis receives broad public support and is associated primarily with the late anthropologist Oscar Lewis.[21] Lewis, who coined the phrase "culture of poverty," developed his ideas while studying poor families in Mexico and Puerto Rican families in San Juan and New York. This thesis maintains that culturally-based attitudes or predispositions such as "present-mindedness" and "obsessive consumption" are the major barriers to economic mobility for many of the poor. This theory implies that providing opportunities to the poor will not be enough: some will need "cultural uplifting" as well. While this theory is largely discredited within academic circles, it continues to wield often subtle but significant influence in public policy debates. However, studies of poor people's values and attitudes have found little support for this theory.[22] The Male Marriageable Pool Index. This explanation was developed by William Julius Wilson and Kathy Neckerman[23] to address the extraordinary rise in the number of Black families headed by women in recent years because so many of the black poor are in such families. They sought to provide an alternative explanation for the phenomenon to the welfare-as-cause argument which their thorough review of the literature found wanting. The index shows that the rise of Black female-headed households in recent decades closely paralleled a similar rise in joblessness among young Black men. The suggestion here is that the lack of jobs among the men is an important component of the increase in such families since the jobless are less able to marry.[24] This idea would appear to have relevance only for Puerto Ricans, among Hispanics, since they alone are characterized by rates of female headship and male joblessness comparable to the high rates obtaining among Blacks. But, the argument rests on the assumption that Black women do not often marry men from other groups. Hence, any evidence that significant numbers of poor Puerto Rican women marry non-Puerto Rican men would undermine the logic of the argument when applied to the group. The multiracial mixture of Puerto Ricans may facilitate higher rates of intermarriage with other groups, especially other Hispanics, than the rates experienced by non-Hispanic Blacks. The Welfare-As-Cause Argument. In his book Losing Ground, Charles Murray[25] has argued that the liberalization of welfare during the 1960s made work less beneficial than welfare and served to encourage low-income people to avoid work and marriage in order to reap the benefits of welfare. Murray argues that poverty stopped decreasing at the same time that social spending began increasing and the proportion of female-headed households began to grow rapidly. However, while real levels of benefits fell during the mid-1970s and after, joblessness and the formation of female-headed households continued rising[26]. According to Murray's thesis, precisely the opposite should have occurred. In addition, Murray's argument would appear plausible only for Puerto Ricans who have both high rates of participation in welfare programs and high proportions of families headed by women. Labor Market Segmentation or Dual Labor Market Theory. According to this theory, racial and ethnic minorities are intentionally relegated to the "secondary" sector of the labor market which is characterized by highly unstable work with low pay and little room for advancement[27]. Once started in the secondary labor market, in addition, workers tend to develop work habits and attitudes which further erode their prospects for better employment. A recent variation of this perspective has been applied to Hispanics by Alejandro Portes and Cynthia Truelove. They argue that high unemployment among Puerto Ricans and low wages among Mexican Americans can be traced to economically motivated discriminatory tastes on the part of employers[28]. Portes argues that the Northeastern employers avoid Puerto Rican workers in order to exercise their preference for the more easily exploitable labor of Dominicans, Colombians, and other undocumented persons. Conversely, Mexicans in the Southwest are preferred by employers precisely because they represent the most exploitable labor in that part of the country. The rationale underlying Portes' argument is that, unlike Puerto Ricans, the other Hispanic groups are forced to work for very low wages either because, as non-citizens, they lack options, or because they may realistically perceive themselves as "best off" here, even at very cheap wages, than they were back home. The strength of this argument is that it can be applied to both Mexicans and Puerto Ricans at the same time irrespective of their varying residential patterns. And, it is consistent with empirical indicators. However, it is not without some shortcomings of its own. For one thing, varying levels of human capital are almost certain to account for some of the ethnic differences in occupation and employment. The rise of professional and other white collar workers among educated Puerto Ricans and Chicanos surely attests to the fact. In addition, in order to apply to Puerto Ricans, as specified by Portes and Truelove, the scenario would appear to require a substantial influx of exploitable (immigrant) labor in order to provide employers with the option of substituting. Thus, the argument would appear to operate best in cities such as New York[29], which have received large numbers of immigrants in recent years, than in places such as Boston or Philadelphia, where proportionately fewer such persons are in evidence. Yet, Puerto Ricans in these cities appear as plagued by poverty and joblessness as those in New York. Moreover, even in New York, employment problems among Puerto Ricans were in evidence prior to the time when the newer immigrants became a sizable group[30]. The Underclass Hypothesis. This argument, proposed by William Julius Wilson[31], begins with the observation that declining housing discrimination and rising incomes among some Blacks have enabled many to leave the older central city ghettos. Their departure from the highly segregated and traditionally underserviced areas, already characterized by higher than average rates of physical deterioration (they are generally the oldest residential areas of the city), exacerbates the purely economic problems confronted by the remaining population. In particular, this group is subjected to residing in areas with unprecendently high levels of area-wide poverty, levels unmatched by any of the remaining urban poor (except for the much smaller group of Puerto Ricans who experience similar levels of poverty concentration in a handful of cities)[32]. In addition, these areas experience a disintegration of important community institutions, such as churches and small businesses, etc., which cannot be sustained in the absence of support by their departed middle class clientele. Finally, the remaining group is subjected to a sharp decrease in economic opportunities since they are among the least skilled and educated segments of the population and are thereby greatly affected by the decline in central city blue collar production noted earlier (see mismatch hypothesis). The employability of the group may also be curtailed by their decreased access to social networks which include job-holders and to job-holding role models Ghetto residents subjected to the described conditions constitute Wilson's underclass. The combined material and environmental deprivation confronted by the group anchors them firmly to prolonged poverty, welfare dependence, and assorted illicit enterprises. This theory is distinct from the earlier noted mismatch hypothesis (upon which it draws) in that the latter explains decreasing work opportunities for inner city minorities more generally, while the former seeks to directly connect the former with the especially high rates of "social disorganization" (chronic joblessness, crime, welfare dependence) that distinguish the ghetto poor from other poor and unemployed. As noted earlier, only the Puerto Rican poor, among Hispanics, are as geographically isolated as poor Blacks and therefore appear to be the only Hispanic population for which this explanation can hold. Like Blacks, they maintain high levels of female headship and welfare receipt. At an early stage of development, the argument awaits further development by Wilson. Human Capital Deficiency Argument. This very general argument maintains that the lack of particular attributes, such as education or skill, is the major cause of poverty. While such obvious facts as the importance of English-language proficiency to getting a job make this position seem straightforward, other facts serve to complicate the picture. For example, even though Mexican Americans are less educated than both Puerto Ricans and Blacks, they are more often employed. In addition, it is widely accepted that many employers require unnecessary educational credentials as a screening device, suggesting that educational deficiencies, per se, are not the full story with respect to who gets hired on many jobs. Finally, studies such as those by Sullivan[33] in New York suggest that White high school dropouts have an easier time finding work than minority dropouts in nearby areas, in part, because of the kinship and ethnic ties to job networks. These explanations, while not exhaustive, are among the most influential in current public debates on poverty. As this summary indicates, taken individually, these theories have significant limitations with regard to explaining the poverty of Hispanics, especially non-Puerto Ricans and those outside of norther, industrial cities. Nevertheless, in combination with the social indicators, these explanations as a whole, lead to fairly clear generalizations about the problems and potential solutions. Decreased employment opportunities for the lesser skilled and educated, particularly in the Snowbelt, along with severely depressed wages among the employed, especially in the Sunbelt, and the restrictions and paucity of social welfare benefits together comprise the major proximate causes of Hispanic poverty. Expanding employment, increasing wages, providing a better living to those unable to work, and promoting higher levels of human capital attainment are major public policy imperatives if these problems are ever to be adequately addressed.   References: 1. See U.S. Bureau of the Census (1988), "Money Income and Poverty Status in the United States: 1987" Current Population Reports Series P-60, No. 161 and (1988), "Poverty in the United States 1986 Current Population Reports Series P-60, No. 160. See also Series P-60, No. 158 (1985 data). 2. Robert Greenstein, Kathy Porter, Issac Shapiro, Paul Leonard, and Scott Barancki (1988), Shortchanged: Recent Developments in Hispanic Poverty, Income and Employment. (Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities). 3. See U.S. Bureau of the Census (1987) "The Hispanic Population in the United States: March 1986 and 1987 (Advance Report)" Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 416. 4. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1988) "Poverty in the United States 1986" Current Population Reports Series P-60, No. 160. 5. Compare figures for 1980 provided in Frank D. Bean and Marta Tienda (1987) The Hispanic Population of the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation) with those for 1980, 1982, and 1987 shown in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1987), "The Hispanic Population in the United States: March 1986 and 1987 (Advance Report)" Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 416. 6. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1987), "The Hispanic population in the United States: March 1986 and 1987 (Advance Report)" Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 416. 7. Joan Moore and Harry Pachon (1985) Hispanics in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall) (p.33). 8. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1988) "Poverty in the United States 1986" Current Population Reports Series P-60, No. 160 and Frank D. Bean and Marta Tienda (1987) The Hispanic Population of the United States. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation). 9. Frank D. Bean and Marta Tienda (1987) The Hispanic Population of the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation). 10. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1988) "Poverty in the United States 1986" Current Population Reports Series P-60, No. 160. 11. Frank D. Bean and Marta Tienda (1987) The Hispanic Population of The United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation). 12. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1987) "The Hispanic Population in the United States: March 1986 and 1987 (Advance Report)" Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 416. 13. See for example, John D. Kasarda (1980) "The Implications of Contemporary Distribution Trends for National Urban Policy" Social Science Quarterly 61 (3/4): 373-700, and (1989) "Urban Industrial Transformation and the Underclass" Annals 501:26-47; See also Loic J.D. Wacquant and William Julius Wilson (1989) "Poverty Joblessness, and the Social Transformation of the Inner City" in Phoebe H. Cottingham and David T. Ellwood (eds) Welfare Policy for the 1990's (Harvard University Press). 14. See John D. Kasarda (1985) "Urban Change and Minority Opportunities" in Paul E. Peterson (ed) The New Urban Reality (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution) and (1989) "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass" Annals 501:26-47. See also Loic J.D. Wacquant and William Julius Wilson (1989) "Poverty, Joblessness, and the Social Transformation of the Inner City" in Phoebe H. Cottingham and David T. Ellwood (eds) Welfare Policy for the 1990s (Harvard University Press). 15. Emmanuel Tobier (1984) The Changing Face of Poverty: Trends in New York City's Population in Poverty: 1960-1990. (New York: Community Service Society). 16. See U.S. Dept. of Labor (1988) Employment and Earnings 35(1): January, and Morris J. Newman (1978) "A Profile of Hispanics in the U.S. Work Force" Monthly Labor Review 101(12):3-14. 17. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1988) "Poverty in the United States 1986" Current Population Reports Series P-60, No. 160. 18. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1988) "Poverty in the United States 1986" Current Population Reports Series P-60, No. 160. It is worth making an explicit point of the fact that none of these families were brought above the poverty line in spite of the assistance, and many were maintained well below the income index. 19. See Kasarda (1983), "Caught in the Web of Change" Society 21(1):41-7 and (1989) "Urban Industrial Transition and The Underclass" Annals 501:26-47. See also William J. Wilson (1987) The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press) and Loic J.D. Wacquant and WIlliam J. Wilson (1989) "Poverty, Joblessness and The Social Transformation of the Inner City" in Phoebe H. Cottingham and David T. Ellwood (eds) Welfare Policy for the 1990s (Harvard University Press) for similar arguments. 20. Christopher Jencks (1988) "Deadly Neighborhoods" The New Republic 198(24):23-32 (June 13). See also David T. Ellwood (1986) "The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Are There Teenage Jobs Missing In the Ghetto?" in R.B. Freeman and Harry Holzer (eds) The Black Youth Employment Crisis (University of Chicago Press) for similar criticism. 21. Oscar Lewis (1959) Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty (New York: Basic Books) and (1966) La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty - San Juan and New York (New York: Random House). 22. See, for example, Lola M. Irelan, Oliver C. Moles, and Robert M. O'Shea (1969) "Ethnicity, Poverty, and Selected Attitudes: A test of the 'Culture of Poverty' Hypothesis" Social Forces 47(4):405-13; Leonard Goodwin (1972) Do the Poor Want to Work: A Social Psychological Study of Work Orientations (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution); and especially, Mary Corcoran, Greg J. Duncan, Gerald Gurin, and Patricia Gurin (1985) "Myth and Reality: the Causes and Persistence of Poverty" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 4(4):516-36. 23. William J. Wilson and Kathryn M. Neckerman (1986) "Poverty and Family Structure: the Widening Gap Between Evidence and Public Policy Issues" in Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't (Harvard University Press). 24. Christopher Jencks (1988) "Deadly Neighborhoods" The New Republic 198(24):23-32 (June 13), in his review of The Truly Disadvantaged, suggests the explanatory potential of the MMPI is somewhat less than apparent because it works best at younger ages (under 24) when few young men would be expected to marry under any circumstances (whether or not employed). 25. Charles, Murray (1984), Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980. (Basic Books: New York). 26. Robert Greenstein (1985), "Losing Faith in Losing Ground" in The New Republic 192(12):12-17 (March 25). 27. See Glen G. Cain (1976) "The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory: A Survey" The Journal of Economic Literature 14(4):1215-57 for a thorough review of the earlier work. For recent variations, see Roger Waldinger (1987), "Changing Ladders and Musical Chairs: Ethnicity and Opportunity in Post Industrial New York" Politics and Society 15(4):378-402 and Thomas Bailey and Roger Waldinger (1989) "Economic Change and the Ethnic Division of Labor in New York City" unpublished paper prepared for the Social Science Research Council, Dual City Project. See also Walter Closed Labor Markets, (New York: Community Service Society). 28. Alejandro Portes and Cynthia Truelove (1987) "Making Sense of DIversity: REcent Research on Hispanic Minorities in the United States" Annual Review of Sociology 13:359-85. 29. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985) 1980 Census of the Population Volume 2. Subject Reports. "Poverty Areas in Large Cities" PC80-2-8D. 30. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1968) "Labor Force Experience of the Puerto Rican Worker" Regional Report No.9 Middle Atlantic Regional Office. 31. William Julius Wilson (1987) The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, THe Underclass, and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press) and Loic J.D. Wacquant and William Julius Wilson (1989) "Poverty, Joblessness, and the Social Transformation of the Inner City" in Phoebe H. Cottingham and David T. Ellwood (eds) Welfare Policy for the 1990s (Harvard University Press). 32. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985) 1980 Census of Population Volume 2. Subject Reports. "Poverty Areas in Large Cities" PC80-2-8D. 33. See Mercer L. Sullivan (1983) "Youth Crime: New York's Two Varieties" New York Affairs 8(1):31-48 and (1989) "Absent Fathers in the Inner City" Annals 501:48-58.